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Abstract
We present a systematic study of ad blocking — and the
associated “arms race” — as a security problem. We
model ad blocking as a state space with four states and
six state transitions, which correspond to techniques that
can be deployed by either publishers or ad blockers. We
argue that this is a complete model of the system. We
propose several new ad blocking techniques, including
ones that borrow ideas from rootkits to prevent detection
by anti-ad blocking scripts. Another technique uses the
insight that ads must be recognizable by humans to com-
ply with laws and industry self-regulation. We have built
prototype implementations of three of these techniques,
successfully blocking ads and evading detection.
We systematically evaluate our proposed techniques,
along with existing ones, in terms of security, practical-
ity, and legality. We characterize the order of growth
of the development effort required to create/maintain ad
blockers as a function of the growth of the web. Based on
our state-space model, our new techniques, and this sys-
tematization, we offer insights into the likely “end game”
of the arms race. We challenge the widespread assump-
tion that the arms race will escalate indefinitely, and in-
stead identify a combination of evolving technical and
legal factors that will determine the outcome.
1 Introduction
We study ad blocking - and the associated “arms race” -
as a security problem. Two reasons motivate this view.
First, online ads and their supporting infrastructure cre-
ate security threats such as malvertising. Thus, ad block-
ing is a security-enhancing measure. Second, ad block-
ers and anti-adblocking scripts can be seen as mutually
hostile pieces of code executing in a shared environment.
∗Dillon Reisman is an independent contractor working with the
Princeton Web Transparency and Accountability Project.
This scenario closely resembles traditional security set-
tings such as malware vs anti-malware tools, and hence
well-known security techniques can be adapted for ad
blocking.
Most previous discussions of ad blocking have as-
sumed that an arms race will escalate indefinitely [34, 16]
or that it will favor publishers/advertisers rather than
users [41]. We challenge this view. Our argument is
based on two key observations. First, ads must be rec-
ognizable by humans due to legal requirements imposed
on online advertising (Section 4.2). Thus we propose
perceptual ad blocking which works radically differently
from current ad blockers. It deliberately ignores useful
information in markup and limits itself to visually salient
information, mimicking how a human user would rec-
ognize ads. We use lightweight computer vision tech-
niques to implement such a tool and show that it defeats
attempts to obfuscate the presence of ads.
Our second key observation is that even though pub-
lishers increasingly deploy scripts to detect and disable
ad blocking, ad blockers run at a higher privilege level
than such scripts, and hence have the upper hand in this
arms race. We borrow ideas from rootkits to build a
stealthy adblocker that evades detection. Our approach
to hiding the presence and purpose of a browser exten-
sion is general and might be of independent interest.
Specifically, we make four contributions. First, we
model the “state space” of actions that can be taken by
users seeking to block ads and by websites seeking to
compel users to view ads. The space has four states, with
two that represent “success” for the user and two for the
website. We argue that this set of four states is a com-
plete model of the system. In contrast to the intuition of
eternal escalation, we show that it breaks down into a set
of three “mini-arms races” which are comparatively easy
to analyze.
Second, we design and prototype several client-side
tools that demonstrate key capabilities that users (or ad
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blockers) possess in the ongoing ad blocking wars.1 The
first, perceptual ad blocking, demonstrates users’ ability
to block ads despite websites’ attempts to make such ads
indistinguishable from other content. We released a pro-
totype tool in mid-April 2017, which has about 30,000
users on the Chrome web store as of this writing.
The second technique, stealth, is a response to “ad
blocker blockers” — recently deployed on several sites
— that check for correct loading of ads. The final tech-
nique, active ad blocking, replaces stealth with offense:
it aims to identify and disable anti-adblocking JavaScript
code.
Third, we introduce a new systematization for evalu-
ating ad blockers, whether existing tools, our new proto-
type tools, or future tools. It reveals that ad blockers must
satisfy a complex set of sometimes-conflicting require-
ments encompassing security, deployability, and devel-
opment effort. The labor-intensive nature of these tools
has often been neglected in the discussion. We introduce
a way to characterize the order of growth of the program-
ming effort of different ad blocking tools in terms of the
scale of the web.
Fourth, we explain that ad blocking implicates a range
of potential sources of legal liability, including contract
law, copyright law, the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. We analyze
the ad blocking techniques that we describe under each
of these sources of law. While the landscape is com-
plex and largely untested in court, we use legal reasoning
grounded in past cases to conclude that most of the novel
techniques can be architected in a way that minimizes le-
gal risk. The details of our analysis are US-centric but
the broad conclusions should apply to other jurisdictions
as well.
The techniques we propose are not perfect, but they
are principled. They give us evidence that if the arms
race continues, users have reasons to be optimistic. A
favorable legal climate and the existence of browsers
friendly towards ad blocking extensions are two key fac-
tors that may tip the scales towards users. Our work
serves as a case study in the interplay between legal con-
straints and security techniques. Unlike the behavior
of malware, the behavior of both publishers/advertisers
and adblocking tools already is, and will continue to be,
shaped by regulations. Finally, our work gives further ur-
gency to the debate about the ethics of ad blocking and
the financial future of web publishing.
1The code for all of our prototypes is available at https://
github.com/citp/ad-blocking.
2 Related Work
Users block ads when browsing the web to minimize
annoyance and “creepiness” [44, 43], to improve per-
formance [25], and due to security concerns [12]. A
number of studies have measured the prevalence of ad
blocking. Analysis of 2015 Neilsen survey data from 11
countries reported a rate of 26% of devices blocking ads
[47]. A measurement study using 2015 data from a Eu-
ropean ISP reported a 22% usage rate among the most
active users [36]. A previous study using 2012–2014
ISP data reported a rate of 10%–18% of households with
at least one device having Adblock Plus installed [32].
PageFair’s annual report, which combines multiple data
sources such as ad blocker / filter list downloads and
website analytics, reports a worldwide rate of 11% and
North America rate of 18% for 2016 [1].
Numerous authors have attempted to develop tech-
niques for ad blocking which reduce the manual effort
of assembling a massive filter list. Researchers have sug-
gested the use of machine learning to enhance filter lists
[18]. Crowdsourcing-based techniques seek to dynam-
ically develop filter lists based off of users’ labeling of
advertisements [14, 11]. Many studies use automated
(especially machine learning) approaches for detection
of trackers; it is unclear to what extent these could apply
to ads [9, 48, 20].
A number of efforts have been made to evaluate the
effectiveness of current ad blockers [36, 46, 39, 30]. As
ad blockers have emerged on the web, work has gone
into detecting them and blocking users who make use of
them [19]. As usage of these techniques has increased,
they have been formalized and measured [33, 35]. Con-
tinuing the arms race, tools are being developed to block
ad blocking detectors themselves [37].
This arms race has parallels with ad fraud techniques
and scripts that seek to detect them. Ad fraud tools seek
to simulate a real user browsing the web and viewing /
clicking on ads. To be effective, they must spoof indi-
cators such as whether an ad is viewable on the screen,
and hide their presence from detection scripts (or dis-
able those scripts). A whitepaper by anti-ad fraud firm
White Ops discusses an ad fraud tool known as Methbot
[45]. While details are scant, Methbot appears to have
developed techniques similar to ours, but arguably more
rudimentary. This technical convergence is noteworthy
in itself, but also highlights the ethical concerns around
this type of research, as our techniques might be misused
in the ad fraud domain.
2
3 Model and state space
3.1 Model
We aim to analyze the “arms race” between users and
publishers: users seek to hide ads from web pages,
but otherwise leave content and functionality unaffected.
Publishers, to a first approximation, seek to ensure that
users can view content or interact with functionality if
and only if they view ads. To formulate this as a security
problem, we need to concretely state a number of intu-
itive assumptions.
The actors and their software. We assume that the
browser (and, if necessary, the device and operating sys-
tem) is completely under the control of the user and mod-
ifiable as desired. We model ad blocking tools not as
independent agents but rather as software tools acting on
behalf of the user. Similarly, the publisher can modify all
first-party content and code as well as third-party scripts
as desired.
This assumption has some limitations in practice.
Browser vendors who are funded by advertising may not
be sympathetic to ad blocking. Other browsers, espe-
cially on mobile devices, may be “locked down” to vary-
ing degrees. We recognize these limitations, but argue
that at least some browser vendors will allow ad block-
ers to exist and flourish, provided user demand continues
to be strong. Indeed, Safari on iOS recently modified
its policy and now allows ad blocking [42] and Firefox
added tracking protection features natively even though
these are also opposed by the online advertising indus-
try [6]. Opera has also recently added native ad blocking
to speed up users’ browsing experiences [23]. Finally,
the new Brave browser has a business model that centers
around ad blocking as a built-in feature. We emphasize
that our focus is on the long-term evolution of ad block-
ing.
Legal boundaries and perceptual ad blocking. Pub-
lishers and advertisers must abide by legal prohibitions
against misleading advertising. In the United States,
advertising disclosures are primarily regulated by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC is em-
powered by Congress to take action against “unfair”
and “deceptive” business practices, and the agency has
adopted the position in guidelines and enforcement ac-
tions that paid advertisements must be clearly recogniz-
able to consumers as such [13, 17]. An advertiser that
relies on misleading content has primary liability under
the FTC Act; a publisher could face secondary liabil-
ity for enabling the misleading advertising. The Euro-
pean Union has adopted similar disclosure requirements
for online advertising, in both the E-Commerce Direc-
tive (2000/31/EC) and the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive (2005/29/EC).
Figure 1: The AdChoices icon. AdChoices is an industry
standard for disclosure of online behavioral advertising.
Online behavioral advertising, which includes much
of online advertising today, is further governed by indus-
try self-regulation. As a component of self-regulation in
both North America and Europe, behavioral advertise-
ments are usually labeled with a distinctive “AdChoices”
icon (Figure 1).
The requirement for ads to be recognizable by humans
is at the core of one of our contributions in this paper. We
introduce the notion of perceptual ad blocking, where
the ad blocker deliberately limits itself to visually salient
information, and recognizes ads just as a human would.
In addition to laws, market forces also have a role to
play. We note that publishers could adopt a range of
advertising techniques that disrupt the user experience,
such as forcing a user to watch a video advertisement
and answer questions based on it before allowing ac-
cess to content. While these intrusive designs are tech-
nically trivial, competition among publishers has so far
prevented such adversarial attempts at monetization.
Blocking tracking is out of scope. In current prac-
tice, blocking of ads and blocking of third-party trackers
have been closely integrated, and have been seen as in-
stances of the same problem. We argue for a different
view. Ensuring that an ad is not seen by the user is (or
can be) a purely client-side intervention, whereas block-
ing tracking requires preventing some network requests
from being made. Perceptual ad blocking, which we in-
troduce, is not capable of blocking trackers, since track-
ers are invisible to users. Conversely, users might choose
to block tracking (say, via Tor browser) while allowing
ads. Thus, the two problems are distinct, and we do not
consider tracker blocking in this paper.
Long-term outlook. Our goal is to analyze the long-
term evolution of ad blocking. Thus, in evaluating dif-
ferent designs, performance is only a minor criterion
since browser performance has tended to improve greatly
over the years. Our design space includes ideas such as
shadow execution of the entire page. Similarly, we con-
sider designs that are not implementable in a extension
in mainstream browsers today, provided that they can be
implemented by a source-code modification. As noted
earlier, there is at least one startup that aims to ship a
browser with ad blocking built in [10].
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Figure 2: The state space. Our model reveals the struc-
ture behind the ad blocking “arms race.” Note that our
model combines publishers and advertisers, and simi-
larly users and ad blockers.
3.2 State space
The state diagram in Figure 2 is the foundation of our
contributions. A (user, publisher) pair is in one of these
states at any point in time. A user may be in different
states with respect to different publishers (in reality the
granularity may be even finer, with some ads on a page
being blocked but not others, but this is not a useful dis-
tinction for us). State transitions happen when the user
employs an ad blocking technique or the publisher em-
ploys an anti-ad blocking technique.
In State 1, ads are visible on the page, either because
the user has not installed an ad blocker or the ad blocker
is ineffective on the page. The user could transition to
State 2 by installing (or improving) her ad blocker, and
in turn the publisher could return to State 1 by obfus-
cating their ads to bypass detection. This is one of three
“mini arms races” that we will consider. A key question
that we will address in Section 4 is whether these races
could essentially go on forever or if there is a principled
reason to expect that one side has a fundamental advan-
tage.
From State 2, the publisher could alternatively re-
spond by escalating the arms race to the next level,
namely by deploying ad blocking detection. Publishers
have recently started turning to this technique. For sur-
veys and measurement studies, see [33, 35]. Once ad
blocking is detected, publishers may nudge the user to
disable it or block the user from accessing the site once
it is disabled. We treat these two as identical; from a
technical perspective, what matters is the successful de-
tection of ad blocking (which defines State 3).
Here the model already reveals its usefulness, in sep-
arating ad blocker circumvention into ad blocking detec-
tion and ad obfuscation. Current user-side tools gen-
erally do not consider this distinction and treat all ad
blocker circumvention as a single problem to be solved
with improved filter lists. However, this distinction is
crucial because robust user-side countermeasures to the
two techniques require very different approaches, as we
will see in Section 4.
The user could respond to ad blocking detection in
two ways, the first of which is making ad blocking more
stealthy (returning to State 2). Stealth is different from
obfuscation. Obfuscation seeks to make one type of con-
tent (or code) hard to distinguish from another, whereas
stealth tries to hide the presence of some piece of code
altogether. Thus, stealth is arguably a more powerful
technique. In Section 4.3 we will see how root-kit style
techniques can be applied to browser APIs to lie about
the existence of an ad blocker.
The second potential user response to ad blocking de-
tection is what we call active ad blocking, which seeks to
detect — and then disable or modify — any publisher
code pertinent to ads. Whereas stealthy ad blocking
seeks to avoid detection, active ad blocking instead seeks
to interfere with the detector code, either by prevent-
ing proper detection from client-side code or prevent-
ing proper handling of detection from server-side code.
Thus, in State 4, both ads and ad blocking detection
scripts are blocked. This may involve static techniques,
such as searching for and modifying code “signatures,”
or dynamic techniques, such as executing a shadow copy
of the code to observe its behavior. In general, this is a
hard problem. The distinction between stealth and active
ad blocking is again one that has been missed by existing
tools.
The publisher may obfuscate their ad blocking detec-
tion code to evade active ad blocking, returning to State
3, and the user may in turn respond by improving the ac-
tive ad blocking technique. But the model makes clear
that no further escalation is possible. That is because
active ad blocking runs at a higher privilege level than
publisher code, so it cannot in turn be disabled — at best
it can be evaded.
Thus, rather than the picture of eternal escalation
evoked by the arms race metaphor, what we have instead
is three “mini arms races.” In the rest of this paper, we
will argue that rather than ad blocking being a game of
whack-a-mole, there are principled ways for users and ad
blockers to make progress over the state of the art in each
of these three mini arms races.
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4 New techniques and tools
In this section we describe our new techniques for ad
blocking and the proof-of-concept tools we have built.
We start with a recap of traditional ad blocking be-
fore presenting our key concept, perceptual ad block-
ing. We defer the evaluation of these tools to Section
5.2. All three of the tools that we implemented (per-
ceptual ad blocking, rootkit-style stealthy ad blocking,
and signature-based active ad blocking) are available at:
https://github.com/citp/ad-blocking.
4.1 Traditional ad blocking
Traditional ad blocking tools use filter lists, which are
lists of known ad locations. The most prominent filter
list, EasyList, is open source and maintained by a com-
munity of users. Enormous manual effort, however, goes
into creating and maintaining the list; EasyList contains
thousands of regular expressions. Table 1 shows a snip-
pet of rules from EasyList. Some of these rules refer to
URLs and others refer to elements on web pages.
When using ad blocking browser extensions such as
Adblock Plus or uBlock Origin, the user subscribes to
one or more filter lists. The extension periodically re-
trieves updated versions of the lists, and it applies the
entire set of filters on every page visit. URL filters are ap-
plied to every outgoing request, and requests that match
any filter are dropped. Element hiding filters are applied
to the rendered web page, and elements that match any
filter are hidden.
The set of features used in traditional adblocking is
disjoint from the features that a human user might use
to identify ads — humans do not see URLs or HTML
markup. One consequence is that traditional adblocking
generalizes well to blocking of third-party trackers. Most
trackers are not visible to the user, but filter lists can just
as easily include regular expressions for tracker URLs
as ad URLs. But a downside is that filter lists have to
constantly play catch-up to stay in sync with the human
categorization of ads.
4.2 Perceptual ad blocking
Perceptual ad blocking seeks to improve resilience
against ad obfuscation and minimize manual effort
needed to create ad blockers. We rely on the key insight
that ads are legally required to be clearly recognizable
by humans. To make the method robust, we deliberately
ignore all signals invisible to humans, including URLs
and markup. Instead we consider visual and behavioral
information. For example, an ad may include the text
“Sponsored” or “Close Ad” within its boundaries, either
directly or when hovered over.
We expect perceptual ad blocking to be less prone to
an “arms race.” Ensuring that an advertisement serving
system is compliant with legal and self-regulatory re-
quirements takes time and expertise. Moreover, when
multiple serving systems share a self-regulatory com-
pliance program, associated disclosures are usually im-
plemented in a uniform and stable fashion. These
properties–inertia and consolidation–are much more ac-
ture for perceptual ad blocking than traditional ad block-
ing. In order to defeat a filter list, all that is required
is moving an advertisement to a different URL; in or-
der to defeat a perceptual ad blocker, an entirely new ad
disclosure standard must be approved. A filter list must
account for diverse idiosyncracies in ad URLs; a percep-
tual ad blocker need only handle the small number of ad
disclosure standards. There appears to be a small, stable
group of such standards and implementations (Section
5.2). We discuss two such standards below.
We note, as an aside, that despite forceful FTC guid-
ance about what constitutes clear disclosure, large mi-
norities of consumers are unable to accurately distin-
guish online ads and most consumers are unfamiliar
with AdChoices, by far the leading disclosure standard
[28, 44]. These shortcomings for ordinary consumers do
not pose a problem for perceptual ad blocking, because
an expert system can be configured to detect cues regard-
less of general consumer familiarity. Our claim is that
as long as the disclosure standards are unambiguous and
adhered to, a perceptual ad blocker will have a 100% re-
call at identifying ads governed by that standard. Indeed,
our techniques could be seen as a way to highlight ads
instead of block them, serving to enhance disclosure.2
Design. Figure 3 shows the high-level design of our
perceptual ad blocker. It consists of a library of percep-
tual functionality which can be utilized by modules cor-
responding to various disclosure standards. We now de-
scribe the modules. The first is used to look for parts of
the page that might potentially contain ads, and the latter
three are used to actually detect the presence of ads.
Container search API. This allows querying for spe-
cific parts of the page based on perceptual features. It is
similar to the standard DOM API functions getElement-
ById and getElementsByClassName, except that instead
of markup such as ID or class name, it accepts visual fea-
tures. The list of visual features in our current prototype
includes element type (e.g., link vs. button vs. text), size
range, location on page, color; the client may also specify
any other CSS properties. It also contains some heuristic
intelligence and allows queries such as “find sidebars”.
Fuzzy image matching and searching. Disclosure
2Taking this idea to this extreme, we may imagine a paradigm where
websites merely mark up ads, and leave disclosure entirely to the user
agent (browser). Different users may require different levels of visual
cues to comfortably recognize ads.
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Rule Rule Explanation
###Ad3Right Hides any container with the ID “Ad3Right”
liverpoolfc.com###FooterLogos Hides any container with the ID “FooterLogos” on liverpoolfc.com
||atdhe.ws/pp.js Blocks any request to http(s)://atdhe.ws/pp.js
.com/doubleclick/ Blocks any request containing the substring “.com/doubleclick/”
Table 1: Examples of EasyList filters — the first two are “element hiding” and the latter two are “resource blocking”.
It is easy to see how ads can trivially be obfuscated to bypass such filters.
Figure 3: Architecture of perceptual ad blocking. Most
of the “heavy lifting” happens in the perceptual library,
allowing the ad blocker to quickly adapt to new ad dis-
closure standards.
standards may contain icons so as to be recognizable to
the user, so perceptual ad blockers need the ability to
search for such images in an ad. Exact comparison is not
sufficient since such icons may have minor variations.
So this API allows scanning for a particular image in any
given container.
Optical character recognition. Some disclosures
contain text rendered as images. Current instances of
this appear to be due to poor programming practices, but
it is also a technique that a publisher can use to attempt
to obfuscate ads. Therefore optical character recogni-
tion (OCR) is an important component of a perceptual
ad blocker. We use the Tesseract library[8], which is a
JavaScript OCR library.
Click simulator. Finally, perceptual ad blocking also
involves behavioral features, of which the main one is de-
termining whether a click leads to a target link of interest
(such as an ad disclosure statement page). Our click sim-
ulator API accepts either an element or (x, y) coordinate
as input, simulates the click, opening any links in hid-
den tabs if applicable, follows redirects if necessary, and
returns the destination URL. For an evaluation of these
APIs, see Section 5.2.
Together, these APIs allow specific perceptual ad
blockers to be expressed succinctly. For example, our
Facebook ad blocker below is expressed with logic sim-
ilar to: “Retrieve all containers that are 450-550 pixels
wide and have right and left borders (newsfeed ads) or
are 225-325 pixels wide and inside a sidebar (sidebar
ads). For each, look for the ”sponsored” text and a link
that leads to Facebook’s ad disclosure page.”
Case study: AdChoices. AdChoices is a self-
regulatory program for behavioral advertising in North
America and Europe. It is aimed at giving users more
transparency and control over ads. It is recognizable by
its icon (see Figure 1) which is shown on ads by par-
ticipating companies, usually in the top right corner of
the ad. The icon links to a page with more information
about the ad or the website’s collection practices. De-
spite the partial coverage of AdChoices in terms of ge-
ography, companies, and type of advertising, we find that
over 60% of ads in a sample of 183 ads from top news
websites are covered by AdChoices (Section 5.2).
Case study: Facebook A few large publishers have
their own ad delivery systems, which may have their own
disclosure standards, so perceptual ad blockers may need
to treat them individually. Of these publishers, Facebook
stands out for several reasons: it is the top website by
traffic and time spent [7, 4], it has a complex ad targeting
system, and it has recently made a concerted effort to
obfuscate its ads.
On August 9 2016, Facebook announced a change
to their site that “renders all ad blockers useless” [21].
The change in question was ad obfuscation: making
the markup of ads sufficiently similar to that of regular
Newsfeed posts that the two could not be distinguished
by filter-list-based ad blockers. A few days later, Ad-
block Plus (EasyList) updated their filter rules, exploiting
the fact that the obfuscation was not perfect, but Face-
book in turn updated their markup. As of this writing,
Adblock Plus remains unable to block Newsfeed ads on
Facebook. This move to defeat ad blockers had a major
financial impact for Facebook’s bottom line, contribut-
ing to a 22% growth (approximately USD 1 bn/year) in
desktop advertisement revenue despite declining desktop
usage [15].
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Figure 4: An example Facebook ad with disclosure high-
lighted
EasyList targets elements to hide using CSS selectors.
This allows extensions like Adblock Plus to block ads
using only a CSS stylesheet, but severely limits the se-
lection capability. A CSS selector allows selection of an
element based on its own attributes and the attributes of
all nodes containing it (e.g. “div#newsfeed div.ad” would
select divs with the class “ad” inside the div with the id
“newsfeed”), but not based on any of the elements that
it contains. Facebook modified their page’s DOM struc-
ture so that all Newsfeed item containers look identical
whether they are ads or non-ads;3 any differences occur
within the container and thus cannot be utilized by a CSS
selector-based technique.
In contrast, our perceptual ad blocker does not rely on
markup. Perceptual ad blocking is especially suited to
Facebook, since the site has a strong disclosure standard
(Figure 4). This might be due to the level of scrutiny of
their advertising practices [3].
Technique. First, we detect containers that might be
ads, and for each such container, we run ad detection.
Container detection works simply on the basis of the ap-
proximate physical dimension of the element. Of course,
this could be circumvented by changing the dimensions,
but that would impact the user experience.
To detect which containers correspond to ads, we de-
tect the “Sponsored” text and the link. There are other
possible markers such as dropdown menu which we
don’t currently utilize. The tool is configured to treat
an item as an ad if any of the markers are found. Other
configurations are possible, such as requiring all of the
3Any attributes that differ between an ad and non-ad, like “id”, also
differ between distinct non-ads.
markers to be present.
Comparison with filter list approach. Perceptual ad
blocking can potentially lead to a major reduction in de-
velopment effort. Each perceptual module requires only
a few tens of lines of code (Section 5.2). There are cur-
rently only a small number of disclosure standards on
the web. However, if there is a proliferation of publisher-
specific disclosure standards, this may erode the advan-
tage of perceptual ad blocking.
Perceptual ad blocking is also more resilient to obfus-
cation compared to filter lists: with the latter, publishers
need only change the URLs of ads and scripts to evade
filters. Since it is a new technique, the resilience of per-
ceptual ad blocking to adversarial evasion remains to be
tested in practice (we discuss it briefly below). At the
very least, it can complement the filter list approach since
it works in a very different way. For example, perceptual
ad detection could be used as part of web crawls to iden-
tify false positives and negatives of filter lists.
Finally, perceptual ad blocking can potentially reduce
accidental breakage of sites caused by insufficiently spe-
cific patterns used in filter lists. Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that this is a widespread problem [5]. However,
the only rigorous evaluation of breakage caused by dif-
ferent approaches requires a large-scale crowdsourced
study [48], so a rigorous comparison of breakage remains
a topic for future work.
Our tool. We released our perceptual ad blocker,
with both the Adchoices and Facebook components, as
a Chrome extension in mid-April 2017.4 Since it is a re-
search prototype, we chose to sidestep potential ethical
and legal concerns about ad blocking by merely high-
lighting ads rather than blocking them. As of this writ-
ing, our tool continues to be effective and has about
30,000 users on the Chrome web store.
Attacks on perceptual ad blocking and defenses.
Publishers may obfuscate ads in various ways to prevent
perceptual ad blockers from detecting ads (false nega-
tives), or cause them to detect non-ads as ads (false posi-
tives), or cause other kinds of collateral damage. We con-
sider three main groups of attacks and defenses against
them. We limit ourselves to ad obfuscation and assume
that the publisher is unable to detect the existence of the
ad blocker. Ad blocking detection will be considered in
the next subsection.
The first attack is simply to change the visual display
of ads. For example, our Facebook perceptual ad blocker
looks for items of width between 450 and 550 pixels, so
Facebook could pick a width outside this range. Devel-
opers of a filter list can push out updates just as quickly
as a publisher can, so this could give rise to a “whack-
4Our tool can be found at https://chrome.google.
com/webstore/detail/perceptual-ad-highlighter/
mahgiflleahghaapkboihnbhdplhnchp
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a-mole” contest between a publisher and an ad blocker.
This type of interaction, though, would require a pub-
lisher to deploy distracting changes to all users on a con-
tinual basis (recall that we are discussing ad obfuscation
rather than ad blocking detection, so the publisher is un-
able to deploy this change to only users who employ ad
blocking).
The second attack borrows from CAPTCHAs and
seeks to obscure the visual presentation of the ad disclo-
sure in a way that humans can understand but ad block-
ers cannot. Possible techniques include rendering ad dis-
closure text (such as “Sponsored”) as a noisy image and
obfuscating which elements are actually visible. As a
simple example, both ad and non-ad elements could con-
tain text such as “Sponsored”, but it would be greyed out
in non-ad elements. Our technique already incorporates
defenses against this, such as fuzzy image matching and
OCR. More importantly, these come at usability costs to
users. For example, the use of images in place of text im-
pedes the ability of visually impaired users to use screen
readers.
The third attack is behavioral obfuscation. Perceptual
ad blocking relies in part on determining the destination
of links, which is not a visual feature but a behavioral
one. There are various ways to obfuscate the existence of
a link, the simplest of which are redirect chains and the
use of JavaScript onClick events to handle clicks instead
of the more standard href attribute. At worst, these and
similar techniques will cause a performance degradation
of the ad blocker due to the need to simulate clicking on
an element rather than simply scan for the presence of
links. A more devious variant of this attack is to obfus-
cate the difference between ad disclosure pages and ad
landing pages. This attempts to force the perceptual ad
blocker to click on ads, allowing the publisher to argue
that its use constitutes click fraud. One defense against
this is only simulate a link click after another ad dis-
closure marker (such as an AdChoices icon) has already
been detected.
Finally, if perceptual ad blocking is successful, pub-
lishers and advertising intermediaries might attempt to
evade legal requirements about advertising disclosure by
relocating to more lenient jurisdictions. While we can-
not rule out this possibility, we note that it is exceedingly
risky for publishers and intermediaries. Regulatory re-
quirements usually apply in the location where business
is conducted, and not just the location where a firm is
incorporated. For example, the U.S. FTC (and state at-
torneys general) can enforce against foreign entities that
do business in the United States. It can also hold domes-
tic businesses, such as publishers, secondarily liable for
violations by foreign partners, such as advertising net-
works.
A fruitful area for future work would be to make per-
ceptual ad blocking less dependent on ad disclosures.
More powerful computer vision and AI techniques may
enable detecting ads whether or not they are explic-
itly disclosed. We also present a policy recommenda-
tion: improving the enforcement of misleading advertis-
ing laws is a light-touch way to enable the development
of more robust ad blockers, thus improving web security
and consumer protection.
4.3 Ad blocking detection and stealth
Ad blocking detection is evolving quickly. For surveys,
see [33, 35]. While the details are in flux, at a conceptual
level we identify three main ways to detect ad blocking,
broadly in line with previous work [35]. (1) Detect the
absence of known ads and scripts. This requires the pub-
lisher to hard-code the location of a “well-known” ad or
(more typically) ad-related script such as DoubleClick.
(2) Detect the absence of “bait” ads. The publisher in-
serts a “fake” ad and checks if it gets blocked. (3) Test
side channels such as timing effects introduced by the ad
blocking code.
Ad blocking detection is arguably a more powerful
technique than ad obfuscation, as it gives the publisher
a variety of responses ranging from a mild appeal to the
user to turn off ad blocking to outright disabling of con-
tent for ad block users. A more sophisticated response
would be to allow only paying users to block ads.
In response to ad blocking detection, we propose and
prototype the concept of stealthy ad blocking. As op-
posed to code obfuscation,5 we seek principled and ro-
bust ways to hide ad blocking. As long as ad blocking
is done locally (as opposed to blocking resources, which
is the primary approach used by filter lists), we can hope
that the publisher server observes no difference due to ad
blocking, leaving us with only the task of fooling client-
side JavaScript.
Defeating client-side checks is possible in principle
because (in our model) the browser acts on behalf of the
user and allows arbitrary customization. There are limits
in practice, but extensions today do execute at a higher
privilege level than publisher JavaScript code. Broadly,
we identify two approaches to stealth. The first is to enu-
merate all the entry points in the browser API that the
publisher code can use to interrogate the state of the page,
and to fake the responses to each such query. This is ex-
actly analogous to the technique used by rootkits at an
OS level to hide their existence and activities. The sec-
ond is to create two copies of the page, one which the
user sees (and to which ad blocking will be applied) and
one which the publisher code interacts with, and to en-
sure that information propagates between these copies in
5Our use of the term here and throughout the paper is very different
from cryptographic obfuscation.
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Figure 5: An illustration of DOM manipulations that en-
able stealthy ad blocking.
one direction but not the other.
Rootkit-style stealthy ad blocking. We present
a general four-step technique for creating a browser
“rootkit” and apply it to stealthy ad blocking. Our tech-
nique works by exploiting the separation between exten-
sion JavaScript context and page JavaScript context. This
is a security-enhancing isolation feature intended to stop
attacks such as webpage scripts sniffing sensitive data
from extensions. Our technique also exploits the fact that
all API calls used by publisher JavaScript to examine the
state of the page can be intercepted and modified by a
browser extension by writing wrapper functions.
Our approach to stealth works in conjunction with any
existing technique for identifying web page elements that
correspond to ads. Perceptual ad blocking falls into this
category, as do the “element hiding” rules in existing
filter lists, but not the resource blocking rules. Thus,
our stealth approach is complementary to perceptual ad
blocking (and is not dependent on it). Once ad containers
are identified, the strategy is to visually block them using
“whitespace” overlay containers, applying the rootkitting
technique to prevent detection of these added containers.
The details are as follows.
1. Add new DOM elements. Figure 5 shows how we
add new DOM elements. Note that all overlay con-
tainers are in their own subtree rather than the more
natural approach of making them sibling elements
of the corresponding ads. This is necessary to hide
their existence. Specifically, we replace all pub-
lisher JavaScript objects that could give away the
existence of the new DOM root with versions that
refer to the original DOM root.
2. Modify DOM traversal API. We identify all API
calls that can be used for traversing the DOM tree
and replace them with modified versions so that
publisher JavaScript cannot reach the actual DOM
root or the subtree of overlay containers. This
ensures that from the point of view of publisher
JavaScript, the page appears unmodified. We iden-
tified and modified 40 such functions in the Mozilla
JavaScript API (see Appendix A.1 for details).
3. Apply CSS rule addition and substitution. We use
a series of regular expressions to modify the orig-
inal style sheets provided by the publisher so that
the rules apply to the publisher subtree and not to
the overlay subtree. We also add our own rules so
that the overlay elements are placed in the right po-
sitions on the page.
4. Handle dynamic changes. Using callbacks or time-
outs, we monitor changes to the publisher subtree
(e.g., a change in the size or position of an ad) that
might necessitate changes to the overlay elements,
and make those changes.
Attacks and defenses on rootkit-style stealthy ad
blocking. In general, rootkits are hard to get right in
practice because of the need to anticipate every single
API call that needs to be interfered with and because
APIs change over time.
Step 2 of our rootkitting technique (modifying the
DOM traversal API) requires converting some JavaScript
properties into functions, since element.parent and
other such accesses are properties and not functions.
There are two ways to achieve this. The first, which
we implemented, is overwriting these properties using
JavaScript. The downside to this method is that pub-
lisher JavaScript can detect the interception of property
access using the Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor func-
tion on the object and property intercepted. Thus, the
publisher will potentially discover that some modifica-
tion to the code by some extension has taken place, but
cannot discover what the changes are (see Appendix A.3
for details). Since there are a variety of reasons for ex-
tensions to intercept property access, the publisher can-
not attribute the changes to ad blocking, and thus this
method still foils ad blocking detection. The second
method requires browser source-code modifications (Ap-
pendix A.1), but avoids this leakage.
Shadow execution style stealthy ad blocker. We in-
vestigated an alternative approach to stealth that works
as follows.
1. Create a shadow copy of the DOM tree. Create a
mapping from each element in the shadow copy to
the corresponding element in the original.
2. Apply ad blocking to the original copy.
3. Execute every API call on both copies — in the
original copy, map inputs to their corresponding el-
ements in the unmodified shadow copy. Return re-
sponses only from the unmodified copy.
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This solution elegantly prevents publisher code from
learning about the existence of ad blocking, since all re-
sponses returned to it come from the unmodified shadow
copy of the DOM. It avoids the need to identify API func-
tions that involve writes, because shadow execution is
applied to every API call. Yet it ensures that all page
functionality will be applied to the original copy which
the user sees.
Compared to the rootkit approach, the shadow ap-
proach has two advantages: it avoids the need to enu-
merate and individually modify all API calls that can be
used for DOM traversal, and it also works with any ad
blocker as a black box. The engineering effort required is
massive, however, and requires significant modifications
to browser source code. A further weakness is that the
creation of two copies of the DOM may be detectable by
the server if it did not properly avoid sending two sets of
network requests. We regard this method to be primarily
of conceptual interest, and did not pursue an implemen-
tation. For completeness, we analyze it as part of our
systematization (Section 5).
4.4 Active ad blocking
A few existing tools attempt to actively disable or combat
ad blocking detection as opposed to the stealth approach
of hiding the existence of ad blocking. For example, Ad-
block Plus has a feature to block pop-up messages that
nudge the user to turn off their ad blocker. This does
not affect ad blocking detection, however, just the action
taken by the publisher. So in our model it does not corre-
spond to a state transition — in effect it is a “no op.” We
regard this as a desirable feature of our model. Blocking
popup nudges is only minimally effective, as a more ad-
versarial publisher could simply disable the downloading
and display of article content if ad blocking is detected.
The approach taken by the “Anti-Adblock Killer” tool
[37] is somewhat more effective. To disable ad blocking
detection, it blocks ad blocking detection scripts from
being loaded and injects innocuous versions of the same
code so that calls to the blocking detection script indicate
there is no blocking. But this can be easily defeated. For
example, on forbes.com the ad blocking detection script
is wrapped in an anonymous function, and all JavaScript
code is served from a single file, which together defeats
the above techniques.
Thus, more powerful methods are necessary. Effec-
tive active ad blocking requires the ability to modify
JavaScript code. Some browsers expose the ability for
extensions to modify HTTP response bodies (including
scripts), but others don’t, and a man-in-the-middle proxy
is required. Incidentally, this makes clear that active ad
blocking is the final stage in the escalation of the “arms
race.” Code that executes in a browser extension or in
a proxy cannot in turn be overwritten. Thus, the pub-
lisher’s response to active ad blocking can only be ob-
fuscation, not further escalation.
Signature-based active ad blocking. The simplest
approach to active ad blocking is similar to the tradi-
tional filter list approach to ad blocking. The human ana-
lyst studies the publisher code on sites known to have ad
blocking detectors, and constructs “signatures” or tem-
plates in a suitable abstraction. These signatures are
shipped to the ad blocker which uses them to scan for
known code in network traffic. The analyst also specifies
how the code should be modified once found. Examples
include changing the return value of a function, disabling
a function altogether, or changing the value of a variable.
The simplest approach is string matching or regular
expression matching, analogous to filter lists or byte sig-
natures for malware. Like filter lists, it has obvious
limitations, starting with randomization of function and
variable names. A more robust approach is structural
JavaScript signatures, which is an ongoing area of re-
search [40]. In this approach, the signature of a piece of
code is invariant to a class of code transformations. In the
malware domain, semantic signatures using call graphs
have also been studied [26], but this technique has not
been ported to JavaScript.
Our current implementation is based on regular ex-
pression matching, which is sufficient for disabling all
known ad blocking detectors so far (Section 5.2). There
is a Firefox version that is a browser extension, as well
as a Chrome version that requires mitmproxy, as it is
not currently implementable as an extension in browsers
other than Firefox.
Differential active ad blocking. We outline a direc-
tion toward automating active ad blocking based on dif-
ferential execution of the publisher code with and with-
out ad blocking enabled. This is an open research prob-
lem. In fact, even in the domain of malware analysis
which has received far more attention, comparable prob-
lems are not quite yet solvable using state of the art tools.
For completeness, we analyze it as part of our systemati-
zation (Section 5).
The technique works in four steps. (1) Execute the
page with and without ad blocking enabled, carefully
controlling all environment variables. (2) Use “visual
diffing” to identify any impact of ad blocking detection
on the ad blocked copy (e.g., a popup nudge to disable
ad blocking). (3) Align execution traces and identify the
code path that led to the visual difference potentially via
techniques such as differential slicing [22]. (4) Identify
API calls made by the publisher code along this set of
code paths; replace their responses in the ad blocked ver-
sion with the corresponding responses in the unmodified
version.
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Filter list 1→ 2  X X X X  F+T
Perceptual 1→ 2 X   X G#  D
Rootkit-style 3→ 2 X N/A N/A G#   B
Shadow copy-based 3→ 2 X N/A N/A  G# X 1
Namespace overwriter 3→ 4 X X X X X  S
Signature-based 3→ 4 Maybe X X X  G# S
Differential execution-based 3→ 4 X    G# X 1
Table 2: Systematization of tools. A half filled-circle means partial achievement of goal. For the order of growth, F
= # of 1st party site; T = # 3rd party advertising scripts, D = # of disclosure standards, S = # of Ad blocker detector
scripts, B = size of browser API. Tools in regular font are existing ones; those in bold are proposed, implemented, and
evaluated by us, and the ones in italics are possible designs that we include here for completeness of analyzing the
design space.
5 Systematization and evaluation
5.1 Systematization
Table 2 systematizes all the techniques described in Sec-
tion 4. We define and discuss each of the properties
(columns), highlighting noteworthy differences between
the techniques.
Blocks tracking: evaluates whether the technique pre-
vents tracking of users. Tracker blocking is inherently
at odds with the idea of stealth, since it requires block-
ing network requests, which is detectable by the server.
Active ad blocking techniques are also not designed to
prevent tracking, though the signature-based active ad
blocker can potentially be configured to prevent tracking
and tracker blocking detection.
Blocks new ads/ad block detectors by default: de-
scribes whether new ads (in the case of ad blockers) or
ad blocking detectors (in the case of active ad blockers)
are blocked by default, rather than requiring manual up-
dating. For example, the differential execution-based ac-
tive ad blocker would automatically disable a novel ad
block detection technique on a site that had not employed
one previously, but our signature-based active ad blocker
would require adding a new site/signature pair in order
to disable the detector. For the two stealth techniques
(rootkit-style and shadow copy-based), the behavior is
determined by the underlying ad detection method on
which they are built.
Resilient to markup or code obfuscation: describes
whether the technique is resistant to obfuscation of
markup in existing ads, or to obfuscation of code in ex-
isting ad blocking detectors. For example, changing the
ID of an ad container would defeat a filter in a filter list-
based ad blocker, but it would have no effect on the per-
ceptual ad blocker as long as the ad consisted of the same
visual features. Again, for the stealthy ad blockers, this
behavior depends on the underlying ad detection method.
Cannot be detected by client-side script: this is the
definition of stealth. When our rootkit-style stealthy ad
blocker is in use, the adversary can detect that there have
been some changes, but cannot determine whether ads
are being blocked or not (see Appendix A.3 for details).
As for the active ad blockers, namespace overwriting and
signature-based techniques work by manipulating either
the DOM or script bodies, and are hence detectable. In
contrast, the differential ad blocking technique modifies
all code that leads to a different output when ads are
blocked, so any client-side scripts that attempt to detect
it will also be interfered with.
Cannot be detected by the server: describes whether
the use of the technique affects the network traffic to the
server, allowing the server to detect its use. This is an-
other key property of stealth and a desirable requirement
for active ad blockers. Both filter list-based ad blockers
and the namespace overwriter active ad blocker block re-
quests to the server, which is necessarily detectable by
the server. The optional link-click simulator module of
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the perceptual ad blocker is detectable by the server, but
the other modules are not. If the shadow copy-based
stealthy ad blocker and the differential execution-based
active ad blocker do not carefully handle requests to
prevent duplicate requests from reaching the server, the
server may be able to detect ad blocking because of the
duplicate requests.
Currently implementable as a browser extension:
describes whether this can be currently implemented as
a browser extension. We have implemented rootkit-style
stealthy ad blocker as an extension but it would require
browser modification to prevent the adversary from de-
tecting any modification to the page. The signature-
based active ad blocker is currently implementable as
a browser extension in Firefox, but requires a proxy in
other browsers.
Order of growth of programming effort: evaluates
the programming effort associated with these tools. For
the filter-list based ad blocker, resource blocking rules
operate on a per-third-party basis and element hiding
rules operate on a per-first-party basis. The programming
effort for the perceptual adblocker is independent of the
number of first parties and third parties, and only depends
on the number of disclosure standards, although the “hid-
den constant” — that is, the amount of work per standard
— is higher than for the filter list. For stealth ad block-
ers, the programming effort to achieve stealth for the
rootkit-style is based on the size of the browser API and
the effort for the shadow copy-based stealth ad blocker,
while considerable, is not dependent on any of the fac-
tors studied in this column. Both the namespace over-
writer and signature-based active adblockers have work
proportional to the number of ad blocker detector scripts,
with an especially large “hidden constant” (Section 5.2).
Like the shadow copy-based stealth ad blocker, the pro-
gramming effort for the differential execution-based ac-
tive ad blocker is a large constant but does not depend on
the number of detector scripts in existence.
5.2 Evaluation
Here we evaluate the effectiveness of each of the three
techniques that we have prototyped, along with the filter
list technique. We defer performance measurements to
Appendix A.2, and emphasize that our focus in this paper
is explicitly on the long-term evolution of this space. We
do not claim that all our prototypes have acceptable per-
formance on commodity machines today (although most
do). However, we expect this to change over time both
due to Moore’s law and due to the gradual performance
improvement of JavaScript relative to native code.
Filter list ad blocker. We argued earlier that creating
and maintaining filter lists is a laborious process. To ver-
ify this, we downloaded the version history of EasyList,
Reported as
Adchoices ad
Not reported as
Adchoices ad
Contains
Adchoices ad 208 4
Does not contain
Adchoices ad 3 238
Table 3: Evaluation of the Perceptual ad blocker in iden-
tifying Adchoices ads.
the primary general-purpose ad blocking filter list in use.
It has had ∼8,000 git commits in 2015, an average of
∼660 per month. These commits added ∼21,600 filters
and removed ∼10,000. Over the history of the project,
12 authors have each made over 1,000 commits.
Perceptual ad blocker. Recall that our perceptual ad
blocker consists of a generic library of perceptual func-
tionality, using which we implemented two specific per-
ceptual ad blockers. We now evaluate the effectiveness
of these two.
Facebook. We evaluated this extension on a sample of
50 Facebook ads, including 35 from the main newsfeed,
10 from the main page sidebar, and 5 from the sidebar
of a “trending topics” page. All 50 ads were correctly
identified. Further, the authors have observed no false
positives or negatives in over six months of regular use.
AdChoices. We evaluated this extension a random
sample of 100 sites from the Alexa top 500 news sites.
To establish ground truth, we manually identified 453
iFrames, of which 212 contained AdChoices ads. In the
vast majority of cases the extension correctly reported
the presence or absence of an AdChoices ad, with only 3
false positives and 4 false negatives (Table 3).
AdChoices coverage on the web. We examined on a
random sample of 20 of the Alexa top 500 news websites,
visited both the home page and one article page on each
of these sites, and collected a total of 173 ads. We manu-
ally classified these to identify which disclosure standard
(if any) was used. The results are summarized in Table 4.
First, about a fifth of ads (37/173) contained no dis-
closure. These ads are potentially non-compliant with
the law, and we expect that this fraction will go down
over time as the industry matures. Of the remaining, the
vast majority followed AdChoices, with a few different
implementations as shown in the table. A small number
(4) were Outbrain, a third-party content recommendation
site with its own disclosure standard. The remainder con-
tained no disclosure in the ad iFrame itself and instead
contained a disclosure by the publisher surrounding the
ad. The adoption of AdChoices is a tremendous increase
from measurements conducted a few years ago [24], and
supports our view that ad disclosures are becoming more
ubiquitous and standardized over time.
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Disclosure # of occurrences
Adchoices
Google 34
TRUSTe 26
Ghostery 21
Taboola 8
Other 18
Adchoices total 107
Outbrain 4
Publisher Disclosure Only 25
No Disclosure 37
Total 173
Table 4: Breakdown of a sample of analyzed ads by type
of disclosure.
Succinctness. Most of the complexity of the im-
plementation is in the perceptual library (578 lines of
JavaScript code). There is also a small library of utility
functions (76 lines of code). The AdChoices ad blocker
is only 28 lines of code, and the Facebook ad blocker
is only 63 lines of code (it is longer since there are
two types of Facebook ads, newsfeed ads and sidebar
ads, with different perceptual properties). All the above
counts ignore empty lines and comments.
Stealthy ad blocker. We created a stealthy ad blocker
based on EasyList. We chose EasyList to make our
stealthy ad blocker independent of the perceptual ad
blocker, given that the latter is not yet field tested (ex-
cept on Facebook). We emphasize that stealth is orthog-
onal to the underlying ad blocking technique, as long as
the technique is capable of returning a list of containers
corresponding to ads on any given web page.
We identified a list of 50 sites from the filter list of
the “Anti-Adblock Killer” tool that were indicative of ad
blocking detection. We manually verified the presence of
ad blocking detection on these sites. We remove resource
blocking rules from EasyList and add a few element hid-
ing rules added to block all ads on these 50 sites. Next,
we visit each of these sites with our stealth ad blocker
and confirm that it is undetected while blocking ads on
all 50 of those sites.
Signature-based active ad blocker. We evaluated our
signature-based active ad blocker on the same list of 50
sites in February 2017.
A 2016 measurement study found a small number of
implementations of ad blocking detection being shared
and reused [35]. In contrast, in early 2017 we found a
radically different picture. There is a proliferation of im-
plementations of ad blocking detection, and there were
40 different implementations among these 50 sites! We
consider implementations to be different if they use dif-
ferent techniques for detecting ad blockers.6 In fact,
a few sites use a multitude of different techniques, the
maximum being six.
For each of these 50 sites, we are able to create regu-
lar expression-based signatures of ad blocking detection.
Thus, while further evolution of this arms race may ne-
cessitate more powerful approaches such as structural or
semantic signatures, vanilla signatures are currently suf-
ficient. Further, in all cases, simple code snippets suffice
to disable ad blocking detection — either forcing the re-
turn value of a function or removal of a “bait” element in-
serted into the DOM by the ad blocking detection script.
Thus, signature-based active ad blocking is currently
a viable approach, but it scales poorly due to the prolif-
eration of implementations. We conjecture that the rea-
son that most publishers have developed their own imple-
mentations is precisely to avoid getting blocked by exist-
ing active ad blockers. Differential active ad blocking,
on the other hand, will require a long-term research ef-
fort. We conclude that stealthy ad blocking, rather than
active ad blocking, offers users the best hope of gaining
the upper hand in the arms race.
6 Legal analysis
The prior sections have characterized the technical di-
mensions of the “arms race” between users and publish-
ers. We considered legal constraints on publishers and
advertisers as part of perceptual ad blocking, but there
are also legal issues associated with ad blocking technol-
ogy, which we analyze in this section. We conclude that
the law does not alter our analysis of users’ ability to de-
ploy sophisticated ad blocking techniques.
We address American law because the largest adver-
tising and advertising-supported businesses are based in
the United States, and because policy disputes about ad-
vertisement blocking have tended to arise in the United
States [38]. Furthermore, if American law permits ad
blocking (which we conclude that it generally does),
there is no realistic mechanism for other jurisdictions to
inhibit consumer adoption of ad blocking. We note that
Adblock Plus has been a target of strategic litigation in
Germany, and has so far prevailed under German law.
We focus on legal liability for providers of adver-
tisement blocking tools, rather than liability for users
who block advertisements, because litigation against end
users has not proven a successful strategy for address-
ing widespread online conduct. For example, the music
industry abandoned its strategy of litigation against end
users, owing to the high cost, limited benefits, and public
backlash [31].
6We have compiled a list of these techniques in an online supple-
ment at https://citp.github.io/ad-blocking/signature-
active/detectorImplementationsTable.html
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Tortious Interference. Users routinely form contracts
with publishers, either through the act of visiting a web-
site or by creating an account [27]. Even absent contract
formation, publishers might reasonably expect economic
advantage (i.e. advertising revenue) in conjunction with
a user’s access to content. State law claims sounding
in tortious interference could enable publishers to vin-
dicate these contractual or economic interests, and pro-
vide injunctive and monetary remedies against develop-
ers of ad blockers. Tortious interference has previously
proven a viable cause of action in related contexts in-
volving user-directed modification to software, such as
litigation against developers of video game cheating soft-
ware and businesses that offer support for enterprise soft-
ware.7
A tortious interference claim would be unlikely to
succeed against an ad blocker developer, however, for
three reasons. First, a publisher would have to prove
that the developer had knowledge of the contractual re-
lationship or economic advantage. When a developer
builds a general-purpose ad blocker, it lacks the requi-
site knowledge.8 Second, a publisher would usually have
to demonstrate that the developer intentionally interfered
with its contracts or economic advantage. While it is true
that ad blocking software has the effect of reducing ad
revenue, its purpose is to benefit consumers with fewer
disruptions. Third, tortious interference claims generally
require proof of wrongdoing, such as misrepresentation
or fraud. There is no plausible wrongdoing between the
developer of an advertisement blocker and the users who
install the blocker; on the contrary, the users have elected
to install the blocker precisely because of how it oper-
ates.
Computer Abuse Law. Federal and state computer
abuse statutes, most notably the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986, have at times been interpreted to en-
compass breaches of online contracts [29]. Even if that
interpretation of computer abuse law were accurate —
most courts now reject it — publishers would still not
have a cudgel against developers of advertisement block-
ers. Computer abuse law does not generally provide a
civil cause of action for secondary liability (i.e. caus-
ing someone else to violate the law).9 And while there
is secondary criminal liability, a prosecutor would have
7See MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 629
F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010); Oracle America, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard
Enterprise Co., No. 16-cv-01393-JST, 2016 WL 3951653 (N.D. Cal.
July 22, 2016).
8This defense is especially applicable to perceptual ad blocking (ex-
cept when specific to a first-party website) and the other generic tech-
niques that we develop in this paper. Custom filter rules, by contrast,
could satisfy the knowledge requirement because they relate to block-
ing ads associated with specific publishers.
9See Netapp, Inc. v. Nimble Storage, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 816 (N.D.
Cal. 2014).
to prove intent — a hurdle which is, as discussed above,
likely insurmountable. We are also exceedingly skepti-
cal that a federal or state prosecutor would elect to bring
criminal charges against the developer of an ad blocking
tool.
Copyright Law. Federal copyright law, unlike com-
puter crime law, does provide for secondary civil liabil-
ity.10 And, if a publisher were to prevail, it could recover
up to $150,000 per instance of infringement.11 A copy-
right claim against an ad blocker developer would be un-
likely to succeed, though, for the simple reason that ad
blocking does not appear to involve duplicating a copy-
righted work or creating a derivative work. And even if
ad blocking were a copyright infringement, developers
would have a strong defense of fair use.12
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The anti-
circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) prohibit circumventing a techni-
cal protection that limits access to a copyrighted work.13
Unlike computer abuse law, the DMCA does include
secondary liability that could reach software developers.
But, critically, DMCA protections only apply if there is
an effective technical protection in place. A trivial pro-
tection, such as a no-copy bit or obfuscation, is not suffi-
cient to sustain a DMCA claim.14 So long as a publisher
does not impose digital rights management (DRM) pro-
tection for its content —- a practice that is rare today out-
side of audio and video content — the DMCA does not
provide a legal tool against ad blocker developers. In par-
ticular, current publisher protection mechanisms involve
merely hiding article content with an overlay element if
an ad blocker is detected, which would be considered a
trivial protection.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an approach to ad block-
ing which is radically different from current techniques.
Current ad blocking is based on the laborious process of
creating filter rules and is easily disrupted by obfuscation
implemented by publishers. In contrast we take a princi-
pled approach to the problem and present solutions that
are easier to implement and harder to evade. Our work
refutes the belief that the battle between publishers and
users is leading to a permanent arms race between the
two parties, and presents a much more nuanced picture.
10See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005);
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001).
11See 17 U.S.C. §504.
12See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984), the “Betamax case.”
13See 17 U.S.C. §1201.
14See MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 629
F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010); Agfa Monotype Corp. v. Adobe Systems,
Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
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Our rootkit technique for stealthy modifications to the
browser may be of independent interest. In particular,
ad fraud detection relies heavily on detecting differences
in rendering behavior between legitimate and fraudulent
browsers. Thus, stealth can be used as an attack on ad
fraud detection, necessitating research into countermea-
sures.
Ad blocking is an important area of study for the secu-
rity community. It combines old techniques from the do-
mains of malware and program analysis with some new
concepts such a mimicking human behavior. There is a
significant need for follow-on technical work into the ex-
pansion of techniques that we have introduced as well as
a debate on the ethics of ad blocking.
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A Appendices
A.1 List of Javascript functions and prop-
erties modified by the rootkit-style
stealthy ad blocker
• Properties on the document: 9
– childNodes
– children
– documentElement
– firstElementChild
– lastChild
– lastElementChild
– body
– scrollingElement
– all
• Functions on the document: 7
– getElementById
– getElementsByClassName
– getElementsByTagName
– getElementsByTagNameNS
– querySelector
– querySelectorAll
– elementFromPoint (requires the experimental elements-
FromPoint function)
• Properties on the fake HTML: 11
– tagName
– nodeName
– localName
– parentNode
– parentElement
– firstChild
– firstElementChild
– childElementCount
– id
– outerHTML
– innerHTML
• Functions on the fake HTML: 1
– insertBefore
• Properties on head: 4
– nextElementSibling
– nextSibling
– parentElement
– parentNode
• Properties on the fake body: 8
– tagName
– nodeName
– localName
– previousElementSibling
– previousSibling
– id
– className
– outerHTML
A.2 Performance
We study the long-term evolution of ad blocking. The performance
numbers reported here may change dramatically over time, and should
be taken in context.
We test the perceptual ad blocker and the rootkit-style stealthy ad
blocker on a random sample of 10 sites from the Alexa top 500. We vis-
ited each site 5 times with a clean browser profile (i.e., having cleared
cache and other local state). These tests were done on a Macbook Pro
running OSX 10.12.2 with a 2.5ghz Intel Core i7 processor, 16 GB of
memory, and a 85 Megabits/s network.
Perceptual ad blocker. We found that the ad blocker adds 0.53±
0.15 seconds of latency to page load times. We disabled the OCR mod-
ule for these measurements, as it is slow (about 1 second per image),
as mentioned earlier. The perceptual ad blocker has nearly identical
effectiveness on the sample of websites we tested even with this mod-
ule disabled. We also note that OCR implemented using native code is
likely to be much faster: we tested the Tesseract C++ implementation
and found it to be about an order of magnitude faster than the JavaScript
implementation.
Rootkit-style stealthy ad blocker. We used the firing of the
DOMContentLoaded event as a proxy for loading of the page. With
no ad blocker, page loads take 1.4±0.27 seconds. With an ad blocker,
page loads take 1.47±0.1 seconds, an overhead of 70 milliseconds per
page load.
A.3 Undetectability of stealthy ad blocking
As discussed in Section 4.3, the key step in creating a stealthy ad-
blocker using a rootkit technique is to overwrite JavaScript functions
that can be used for DOM traversal, like this:
window.targetFunc = function() {
return <modified_code>;}
However, this modification can be both detected and inspected
by an adversary. An adversary can call one of three source inspec-
tion methods: toString(), toLocaleString() (which just calls
toString() by default) and toSource(). Using toString as an ex-
ample, the adversary would call window.targetFunc.toString(),
which provides a string copy of the functions code; in this case,
function() { return <modified_code>;}
Every function inherits this default toString method from the
function prototype. To prevent inspection, the stealthy adblocker can
overwrite the function’s default toString with a modified version. For
example:
window.targetFunc.toString = function() {
return <original_code>;}
However, the adversary can circumvent this as well, by find-
ing another function, say window.innocentFunc, and copying the
toString function from innocentFunc to targetFunc. This en-
sures that targetFunc.toString() will return
function() { return <modified_code>; }
To prevent this, instead of modifying toString on a case-by-case
basis, we modify the universal toString function on the prototype to
hide all of our modifications.
Finally, the adversary may turn to protected objects. These are ob-
jects or properties that scripts, including those in extensions, cannot
overwrite. For example, some security properties rely on the property
window.location to be accurate, so JavaScript code cannot over-
write this property [2]. Because of the adversary’s ability to transfer
any correct toString function to one of the modified functions, if any
function’s toString method is protected, it can be used to reveal the
details of our modification. We found no protected objects that allowed
this attack at the time of this writing, but if such a protected object was
introduced in the future it will cause difficulties for our method, and
might require a browser modification to fully protect against.
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